Armoured Vehicles - Rear Cargo Safety – Tie It Down Before It Becomes an Internal Missile

Armoured Vehicles - Rear Cargo Safety – Tie It Down Before It Becomes an Internal Missile

To be sure, users and uparmouring companies spend many weeks designing and building what is thought to be a civilian armoured vehicle that is safe from known dangers, agile and meets the user’s needs.

However, in my many years in this industry, I continue to see that stakeholders ignore the dangers inside the vehicle! And the one of the biggest danger comes from unrestrained items stored in the rear cargo section.

Unrestrained cargo can easily become an internal missile when the vehicle is involved in an incident e.g. collision, rollover or blast.

Some time ago a client asked me to conduct a safety review of this vehicle (left), which was operating in a very hostile environment. It is unfortunately a good example of a very unsafe vehicle. Without too much effort, the unrestrained, and poorly restrained, equipment will end up flying forward in the vehicle cabin and will quite likely cause serious injury to the occupants.

When it comes to duty of care, all stakeholders have a responsibility to ensure that the interior is also designed and built with safety in mind and is fit for purpose.

What is required is a dedicated rear cargo design that incorporates suitably rated shackle points, appropriate containers and netting to provide restraint for tools and first aid kits etc. In addition, suitably rated brackets are needed for all items bolted to the vehicle’s internal wall e.g. fire suppression tanks and wheel jack.

A rear cargo barrier can also be used but this will inhibit the ability for passengers to cross load or gain access to escape through the rear cargo.

The lesson learned from this is that with a bit of forethought into the rear cargo area design, you can well save the occupants from significant injury…. or worse.

Armoured Vehicles - A better way for fuel tank protection on a civilian armoured vehicle

Armoured Vehicles - A better way for fuel tank protection on a civilian armoured vehicle

What do you think is global demand for buggy whips in 2024? You know, those whips that horse and buggy drivers used around the turn of the turn of the 19th or 20th centuries?

Well, a simple Google search reveals that demand for buggy whips is not all that much. After all, there are not all that many buggies around, right? To be sure, this product went the way of most products that did not keep up with technological innovation.

I’ve been involved with civilian armoured vehicle for more than 20 years, and for much of that time, the common approach has been to protect a vehicle’s fuel tank by surrounding it with armoured steel.

Great idea, right? After all, if the rest of the vehicle is protected with this steel then why not the fuel tank? Makes perfect sense.

Historically, there have been two main ways to build in protection for the under vehicle fuel tanks on armoured vehicles. 

The first is for the uparmouring company to weld armoured steel to the underside of the vehicle in such a way that it surrounds the fuel tank system. The fuel tank is then protected from projectiles that could either be kicked up from underneath the vehicle or enter from the side.

While this has been the traditional and most commonly used method of fuel tank protection, it is important to consider whether this is the best way to do so

PRO: 

A solid metal surround that provides good protection.

CON:

• Significant additional weight and cost of the armoured steel;

• Potential for a build-up of heat between the fuel tank and the armoured steel surround;

• Potential for fuel supply problems due to excess heat around the fuel tank;

• Has an effect on the vehicle’s mobility - particularly as it adds weight to one side of the vehicle;

• Will be get more and more rusted over time - both on the inner and outer sides;

• Significant difficulties in removing fuel tank if required to do so for servicing or replacement.

The second way is to coat the fuel tank itself with a self-seal protective coating. With this readily available commercial application, a projectile would not be stopped from piercing the fuel tank. However, it will allow it to pass through and then self-seal the fuel tank so that the tank does not rupture and cause a significant leak. Nor should it pose any materially increased risk of the fuel (particularly petrol) exploding - this is usually done by inserting baffles in the fuel tank. While it will marginally reduce the total volume capacity of the tank, it is generally not seen as a major negative consideration.

PRO:

• Significantly reduced weight as compared to an armoured steel fuel tank surround;

• Easily removable for servicing or replacement;

• Minimal effect on vehicle mobility characteristics;

• Minimal increase in the risk of fuel volatility;

• No additional heat stress to the tank or fuel itself;

• Widely used by major fleet owners - both military and civilian.

CON:

Higher (but not significantly) price for initial installation;

Does not prevent projectile penetration but being self-sealing it will minimise fuel loss.

Conclusion

In the end, a user needs to weight the risk of a project penetrating a fuel tank and causing an explosion or critical fuel loss against the benefits of lower weight and through life costs associated with the armoured steel option.

As the buggy whip was useful for the forward momentum of a vehicle, I would suggest that the armoured steel surround is not the most effective and efficient method of protecting a fuel tank on a civilian armoured vehicle.

Armoured Vehicles - VPAM ERV Edition 3: Blast Protection Standards and the Challenge of Transparency

Armoured Vehicles - VPAM ERV Edition 3: Blast Protection Standards and the Challenge of Transparency

Independent certification of blast protection for civilian armoured vehicles is crucial for ensuring procurement best practices.

Despite this, some procurement agencies still rely solely on uparmourer claims of "B6 materials" for assessing protection levels. Armoured Consulting, however, believes this approach is misguided and irresponsible.

Procurement agencies have a legal duty to minimise risks to vehicle occupants. Investing in civilian armoured vehicles without independent verification of armour design is, in our view, negligent and exposes agencies to potential legal liabilities if protection fails to meet the “reasonable man test”.

The VPAM ERV Edition 3 standard introduces a 3-star rating system to communicate the level of a vehicle’s blast protection. The aim is to effectively communicate occupant safety against specific explosive threats to the side, roof and under a vehicle.

However, significant concerns arise due to the lack of transparency in how this rating is determined. This is affecting all the major stakeholders including uparmourers, procurement agencies and end-users.

Understanding VPAM ERV Edition 3 and its Blast Protection Standard

VPAM ERV Edition 3 establishes specific protocols to test and evaluate civilian armoured vehicles against explosive threats, including side, roof and under-vehicle blast events. Developed by VPAM, this standard provides repeatable testing methodologies to assess vehicle performance under specific blast conditions.

A significant feature of the VPAM ERV Edition 3 is its new evaluation criteria, including the use of a Biofidelic dummy and an assessment matrix based on DGU emergency room criteria.

Challenges in Transparency of Blast Test Results and Ratings

Procurement agencies face challenges accessing detailed information on the evaluation matrix, including criteria, weighting factors, and performance thresholds used in blast tests. This lack of transparency impedes decision-making, making it difficult to compare and interpret blast test results from different uparmourers bidding on supply contracts.

Typically, procurement agencies receive a star rating certificate and a possibly also a limited test report, There is a lack of crucial data to effectively assess the strengths and weaknesses of protection solutions. For instance, interpreting differences between a 3-star side blast rating at 4 meters versus a 2-star rating at 3 meters becomes challenging without clarity on what "Dummy Slightly Damaged" entails for risk assessment and mitigation strategies.

As someone who spent many years responsible for the procurement of civilian armoured vehicles, I find this lack of transparency to be unacceptable and a failure of the VPAM/testing agency’s professional responsibility.

Conclusion

The lack of transparency surrounding evaluation matrices and test data undermines the credibility of standards like VPAM ERV Edition 3 - it erodes trust in their validity.

Enhanced transparency in evaluation matrices and test data, particularly regarding "Damage to the Dummy," can foster consistency, objectivity, and trust in evaluating armoured vehicles. This transparency is crucial for developing more reliable security solutions in the face of evolving threats.